Mike Pompeo's Easter weekend meeting with Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang is reminiscent of Henry Kissinger's secret trip to Beijing in 1971, preceding President Nixon's world changing meeting with Mao Zedong seven months later. Both trips by the American president's foreign policy advisor sought to redirect a highly adversarial relationship; to reflect a sensitivity to the customs of Asian leaders; to place a premium on personal relationships; and to lay the groundwork for agreements of world-changing importance. By all accounts and subsequent statements from both sides, Pompeo accomplished his objective.
It will be critical to manage scope and focus. North Korea's nuclear and missile programs are on the verge of being capable of delivering warheads anywhere in the world - or of selling the technology to others. This cannot stand - whether by military means or by diplomacy. There are other issues with North Korea - the incarceration of three Korean-Americans on espionage charges; repatriation of Japanese citizens kidnapped decades ago; computer hacking; the murder of Kim's half-brother in Malaysia; North Korea's chemical and biological programs; sanctions and economic development. Legitimate, but extraneous, issues must not be allowed to distract from the purpose, although they may serve as indicators of good will and quid pro quo's.
Fortunately, we have examples of success to emulate, and failure to avoid.
- For success, there was the controlled dismantling of the nuclear capabilities of former Soviet states (Kazakhstan; Ukraine; Belarus; and, to a lesser extent, Russia) in the 1990s. International structures were established for verification. Economic rewards were timed to performance. Scientists were provided alternative employment.
- For failure, there is the 2015 Obama / Kerry agreement with Iran, where there are no limits on missile development, nuclear facilities are not dismantled, inspections do not extend to military sites, and the agreement expires without future commitments beyond a decade.
This is a complex, multi-party process. While the United States has the lead, China has a major role to play in ensuring that North Korea understands their limited options, and in guaranteeing any eventual agreement. South Korea will play a major role in any economic development package, as well as in the new political / diplomateic order. Japan has a major interest. Russia borders North Korea, and has an interest. The US negotiating team will need to deal with military, economic, political, and technical issues. Fortunately, there are a lot of experts; what is needed is leadership.
Trump's Kissinger is Mike Pompeo: graduated first in his class from West Point; Harvard Law Review; successful businessman; three term congressman from Kansas; easily approved as Director of the CIA; has established a working relationship with Kim Jong Un. Perhaps most importantly, he has the confidence of the president, and knows his way around the Defense Department and the intelligence community. Unlike John Kerry, he will not come seeking "peace in our time".
What could go wrong?
1. The Democrats did their best to prevent Mike Pompeo from playing the crucial role, without any denial of his qualifications or glimmer of a better option. Objections fell into three categories:
- He is too conservative (on Iran, immigration, and the Middle East) for the Secretary of State position, particularly when coupled with John Bolton, Trump's new National Security Advisor. Tradition, including the Republican Senate in the past administration, has overwhelmingly given the president the right to pick a Secretary of State who agrees with him. Not this time for 42 Democrats.
- He refused to engage with Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer on the irrevelant question of whether legislation is needed to protect Special Counsel Mueller and Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein from being fired. That says nothing about Pompeo, but much about Schumer.
- Trump and Pompeo might just succeed. Better that we have a nuclear North Korea than a second term of President Trump.
2. Despite effective sanctions, apparent alignment between Trump and Xi Jinping, and encouraging statements by Kim, he could be unwilling to give up his one international bargaining chip. We've been here (or nearly here) before. This time sanctions are real, and China is apparently on board.
3. Kim (and China) may believe that he can outlast Trump. Unlike Kim who kills potential rivals, Trump has a special counsel searching for any wrongdoing, the political opposition calling for impeachment, potential loss of control of the House, and a Senate which will barely confirm qualified cabinet secretaries. One of the rules of dealmaking is to be sure that your counterpart can deliver; the leader of the Hermit Kingdom may have his doubts.
Confirmation of Mike Pompeo should be the news of the week, even more important than Comey's book tour, Stormy Daniels' upgraded booking fee, or Bill Cosby's conviction. In our media system it is not, but in any case he can now get to work on the most important problem facing the world.
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This week's bonus video is an interview with former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Jack Keane, discussing the leadup to the North Korean nuclear negotiations.
bill bowen - 4/27/18
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