President Trump is playing two simultaneous chess games - one to denuclearize North Korea; the other to make a quantum change in our trade deficit with China. Since Chinese cooperation is critical in controlling North Korea, the two are intertwined. Understanding the likelihood of success in either negotiation is difficult, both because the terrain is complicated, because much of the mainstream media paints everything Trump does as a failure, and because much of the financial media is opposed to any changes to current business arrangements. The Korea negotiation is the harder of the two, because the objective must be completely obtained; "success" in the trade negotiations can be more flexibly defined. This optimist believes that The Donald has a plan which can accomplish both objectives.
On the plus side, Trump offers a clear statement of the intended outcome: verifiable total de-nuclearization of North Korea; halving the trade deficit with China. In a world where many American interests are part of the negotiation, he is unafraid of offending his knee-jerk opponents, and even his allies. A first priority was to establish a personal relationship with the key decision makers - he directly with Xi Jinping in China, and Secretary of State Pompeo with Kim Jong-Un. Symbolism is important - Kim understands that he is below Jinping and Trump, and how and when he gets to meet with Trump is part of the negotiation. It is fair to assume that Kim's two meetings with Jinping included some direction from Beijing, and some discussion of personal safety guarantees. Trump is a good negotiator - he is keeping all of his powder dry, rather than making concessions just to get negotiations going.
On the minus side, Trump hires some terrible advisors. The clear path of the recent backtracking in the Korea negotiations could be summarized as: a period of positive statements and symbolic good will gestures (releasing prisoners; demolishing North Korea's nuclear test site); John Bolton musing that we needed to follow the Libya model (in which Muammar Gadaffi gave up his nuclear program, was deposed, and was assassinated); a series of understandable belligerent comments by Kim; a re-siezing of control by Trump in which he cancelled the planned June 12 meeting; and a new set of positive comments and planning activities with Kim, Trump, China, and the South Koreans. The totally unnecessary problem was precipitated by Bolton acting in his prior commentator / provocateur capacity rather than someone who actually is a central part of the administration. He was hired to project a tough stance during the negotiations, but was not smart enough to know how to play the role. He has apparently been taken to the woodshed, not to be heard again unless Trump needs some bluster at a future sticking point.
On the "To Be Demonstrated" level, it is an advantage that Trump can control all of the elements of the American game. He can accept a "strategic direction" of decreasing our current annual trade deficit of $375 billion by $200 billion - the type of thing that heads of state can agree on privately, without giving their domestic opponents a specific number as a rallying point. (Agricultural and oil/natural gas sales to China will be substantially increased to the detriment of Australia and Brazil. Expansion of US sales of technologically sensitive items will be a longer term negotiation.) Trump can agree to "solve" the ZTE problem - in which the Chinese telephone company is near bankruptcy as a result of American sanctions following prohibited activity with Iran. (Congress complains; the media complains; the Democrats complain, but Trump agrees that will be enough for ZTE to fire some key employees and change a few members of the Board of Directors.) It will be enough to have strong momentum on trade through the time that firm comitments are made on North Korea's nukes.
This is also multi-player chess. The South Koreans know that they are on the front line of disaster if negotiations fail - and are willing to pay a good piece of the North Korean redevelopment cost. The Russians want a place at the table - and could be a problem if they stop enforcing sanctions. Countries bordering the South China Sea will get nervous if Trump trades acceptance of Chinese militarization of their newly built islands in exchange for North Korea or trade concessions - actually a recognition of the new reality might be acceptable if it seals a big deal.
The "off again-on again" meeting planning should be viewed as a good thing - both because Trump's immediate response showed a full understanding of the need to guarantee (with China's help) Kim's longevity in power, and because Kim's willingness to put Bolton's gaffe aside indicated the extent to which he needs to substantially improve the economic circumstances in North Korea. This is a deal that the two of them need, and can make. The key is for Trump and Pompeo to be able to retain focus for the year it will take to agree on actions, timelines, and guarantees. And to remember the stakes.
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This week's video chronicles the current high-level discussions between North Korean Vice Chair Kim Yong Chol, Secetary of State Pompeo, and others in preparation for the Trump-Kim meeting in Singapore. While "it ain't over til its over", all of the right steps seem to again be in alignment.
bill bowen - 6/1/18
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